Rejects Not Rebels

A counterinsurgency is inherently socio-political in nature, and its resolution requires socio-political solutions. But there's something important to bear in mind when we consider AQI's involvement in the Iraqi insurgency, which is that AQI is not part of the insurgency - not a valid one, anyway.

AQI, while some news outlets make the claim that they are regaining their footing, is not actually a valid socio-political group in Iraq. 90% of suicide bombers are recruited and imported from foreign countries. AQI does not have the support of the public at large or even a section of the public large enough to make their political and social position tenable. They are also regarded as the enemy by such true insurgent groups like Ansar al-Sunnah and Jaish al-Mahdi. Moreover, their socio-political aims are preposterous and nearly everyone involved knows it.

AQI, then, is not part of the insurgency; they're merely part of the criminal element. A particularly nasty strain of criminal to be sure (a terrorist strain), but that's really all they are. Terrorists and insurgents are - importantly at this point in the prosecution of the war in Iraq - not the same thing. I realize that I've said otherwise before, but the situation has changed drastically in the last year and it's now important to draw the distinction as important elements of what I once referred to as "terrorists" have mutated into something else. To clarify the point further, there is this article about Al-Sadr and JAM at the Asia Times:

"As a political and military force, Iraq's Shi'ite Sadrist movement has undergone a number of radical transformations since 2003, when its leader Muqtada al-Sadr surprisingly emerged as a leading political figure. Muqtada's recent decision to continue with his seminary studies and graduate as an ayatollah at the conservative seminary school of Najaf underpins a major change in the movement's structure that could have serious repercussions for the future of Iraq."

The article, by Dr. Babak Rahimi, is undoubtedly the most useful thing I've read regarding the Sadrist movement in several months and perhaps ever; it's worth your time to read the whole thing.

An insurgency adapts to the environment around it and is willing to adopt different methods to achieve their social and political ends, and they usually do it with some degree of public support that is not by any means negligible. Al-Sadr and JAM are the perfect example of this, while AQI has only ever had the same handful of methods they use everywhere, and operate through public fear, not support. This tactic is just as extremely limited in winning an insurgency as an American conventional military strategy would be against an insurgency; it is heavy on firepower, and light on politics, and the social aspect barely exists as far as the strategy is concerned.

None of this is intended to suggest for even a second that AQI isn't a threat to US interests and the future of Iraq; they demonstrably are, but they cannot win the war. They don't actually stand a chance of coming to power in Iraq provided the ISF becomes capable of effective internal security. The fact that AQI and various Iraqi insurgent groups happen to be pushing the ball in the same direction with violent activity is little more than a coincidence, probably not a conspiracy. Every element of the Iraqi insurgency must know by now that should they actually come to power, AQI will immediately become their policing problem as opposed to a problem for the ISF and the current IG. Which is why the Sadrists, notably, have adopted an anti-AQI stance; they know they'll have to have it anyway if they win.

And, Unlike AQI, should prosecution of the counterinsurgency by the US and the Iraqi government fail, the Sadrists may actually have a serious shot at a win - but not until after a very nasty and likely protracted civil war with multiple parties in the military arena. They won't be able to do it without those prior failures, however, which makes the US effort that much more important now, because that's the real counterinsurgency.

Stripping Al-Sadr and JAM and other groups like them of social and political relevance is the single most important goal in this war, and that is done by providing whatever it is that they provide to their constituents more effectively than they can. AQI is dangerous to be sure, but the approach toward them is the same as it is towards all irreconcilables: kill them, detain them, or push them out. AQI is the easy part, relatively speaking. And that's because they're not insurgents, they're terrorists.

Scraps From The Blackout

Continuing campaign coverage in the US is creating a dearth of useful information about Iraq, but there are a few things worth taking note of right now.

The first, and arguably the most important, is that the US Army is working on a new combat manual:

"The new guide is seen as a major development that draws on lessons of the wars being fought by US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq."

As soon as it is published, I'll find a PDF copy and link to it in the Required Reading section, after reading it myself. The change in the command atmosphere and personnel that General Petraeus has created is inevitably going to influence it, so it will be interesting to see how it develops as well as being critical to understanding how soldiers are going to be expected to conduct themselves. Much of Petraeus' counterinsurgency strategy stands to be augmented by an intelligent manual, as it tends to be very human-oriented in many respects.

Second is a memo written by Manuel Miranda that is very critical of State Department conduct in Iraqi affairs. Read the whole memo, bearing in mind that it is only one opinion but it's a valuable one to have. What I found most interesting was that he restricted his criticism to the State Department, and lauded the Military on it's progress and it's commitment to the commanding general's efforts. If he's right, it would seem that State could learn a thing or two from the Military about execution. Not that this should be a revelation.

Lastly is a remark at the bottom of a non-story at Al-Jazeera. Al-Sadr has responded to internal pressure by reiterating that the current JAM stand-down will not be lifted early, but the interesting comment is this:

"US commanders have said they are confident that al-Sadr, the son of a revered Shia cleric killed under Saddam Hussein, would extend the freeze, although US and Iraqi forces continue to target "rogue" Mahdi Army units."

I wouldn't have expected anyone to be confident of that, but this once again makes me very happy that there are people in charge who know much more than I do. JAM still stands to threaten the peace in Iraq, and if they start rolling again it'll be the ISF that has to take them on, which now includes Basra province. The Iraqi street doesn't like JAM where they've been responsible for violence already, but whether that will stop someone who's fanatical enough to try to be rubber-stamped as an Ayatollah is doubtful.

It comes down to this one consideration: if the freeze is extended, we can keep moving the ball forward. If it gets called off, we may very well be starting again from scratch in the wake of whatever violence JAM is capable of generating. As long as command is confident that particular bull won't be released in the china shop, then our approach doesn't need to change.

Measures of Men

A post over at DailyKos has attempted to argue that the American effort in Iraq has gone nowhere and accomplished nothing. It's author is attempting to make this claim on the fact that since last month, US casualties have increased, although the first sentence makes what must have been a very difficult concession to make:

"For the first time in five months, month-to-month deaths in Iraq have increased."

So they begin this rant by admitting that they don't have a trend. They then continue by creating a trend of their own:

"That's two more than the number of deaths in May of 2005..."

"That's six more than the number in March of 2006..."

"And that's the same number as the number of American deaths in November of 2007..."

Certainly, if we're allowed to pick and choose what months we'd like to represent, we can create all sorts of illusory items. We could even go on to claim that we've made no progress, so long as we don't look at things like political changes, security changes, or confusing things like numbers and trends. And since its Kos, they do:

"This week, we learned that despite claims that the surge is a "success," it has done nothing but brings us back full circle. Back to a U.S. military presence of some 130,000 troops"

This kind of myopia is ignorant enough that I don't feel the need to lecture on it; it's preposterous on its face, there's no debunking necessary. This kind of willful ignorance will only fool those who are not paying any attention, and those people don't read this blog.

At the end of the Kos posting, is a list of those American soldiers who died doing their country's will in January. On this list of the names of heroes is one that you may be familiar with.

"Andrew J. Olmsted, 37, Army Major, Jan 03, 2008"

Major Olmsted has asked that his death not be politicized, and Kos has not obeyed those wishes as the inclusion of a list of fatalities in the post politicizes every one of them. But I won't do that here.

I can't tell you what Major Olmsted's values were, or why he died, or what he might have died for. But he can. His friends honored his wishes to have a final blog post put up. Read it here, and don't let anyone else tell you his story.

Moving on.

It is one thing to count American casualties, as the Kos post has done so gracelessly. It is entirely another to censor facts for effect. As a blogger, you always read more than you include in a post. If you don't, you've done a bad job. But that's not to say its not a problem when your editing process ends up being intentionally misleading. You leave more than you say on the cutting room floor every time you post, so you have to be careful not to trim off the truth, or leave out important considerations.

One such important consideration is the number of Iraqi fatalities in the same month, seeing as it is their country and whatnot. But the Kos post doesn't mention Iraqis, quite simply because the poster does not care about them. I've said that before, but it bears repeating. So how have the Iraqis fared this past month? According to icasualties.org, they suffered 542 fatalities in January, compared to 548 in December and 560 in November.

So while reinvigorated offensive operations in Mosul and other locations have increased American fatalities, the Iraqis' trend, while less impressive, has held. Good for them. But let's not fool ourselves and say that the deaths are all that matters.

We have not gone to war to prevent the deaths of our soldiers. We have gone to war to secure a more lasting peace, and security for a greater portion of the world. Here that means putting our soldiers in harm's way, knowing full well that their armor, weapons and training will not save all of them. This is what makes them heroes. This is what advances the cause of freedom. This is also why soldiers die. That shouldn't be forgotten, no matter what the casualty count looks like.

Each soldier fights for their own reasons, and is willing to die for different reasons. As a result, we cannot possibly understand fully the death of each soldier; we can only look to see what the actions that led to their deaths have gained. It is a crude an unjust method of measuring a man's worth in war, but at the strategic level it is all we have. To strip us of that is to leave us without any way of understanding the war or the men engaged in it.

For DailyKos to declare that the deaths of Americans and Iraqis have gained us nothing because they are higher this month than they were last month is every bit as unfair to their memories as it is false.