Al-Sadr, Basra, And The Ugly Part

The word going around lately is that Al-Sadr is using his down-time to restructure JAM (duh), and that he's going to try to build it in the image of the Lebanese Hezbollah organization:

"Many analysts say what may re-emerge is an Iraqi version of Lebanon's Hezbollah — a state within a state that embraces politics while maintaining a separate military and social structure that holds powerful sway at home and in the region."

I'd say that the Sadrist bloc is already there, whether we'd like to admit it or not. Should they actually start being called an Iraqi Hezbollah, there will be no substantive change; Sadrists are already a powerful political bloc both inside Iraqi parliament and in the population, to say nothing of the militia force. The transformation will be only a symbolic one, from "Iraqi Warlord" to "Terrorist Organization."

We know that al-Sadr is an opportunist; he can be expected to operate according to his own interest, which is harvesting power by any means necessary. Al-Sadr is not an Iraqi nationalist any more than Adam Gadahn is an American patriot, and the restructuring of JAM for loyalty purposes is not for the benefit of the Iraqi people. From Sami Moubayed:

"That is what Muqtada wants the world to believe, and it is very true - but for different reasons. Muqtada is conducting a facelift to make himself look nicer in Iraq. He is doing it to restructure, organize and empower himself to take over Basra."

With the British withdrawal and further retreat expected, the ISF will be expected to handle Basra on an independent basis, and if al-Sadr is planning to own the province, there's going to be a fight. This is not the worst thing that can happen - unless you happen to live there.

An ISF versus JAM showdown in Basra could give al-Maliki a chance to stand up as an agent of the Iraqi Government instead of a sectarian agent, it could give the ISF a chance to prove their worthiness in combat to the Iraqi people, and it could give JAM a much-needed thrashing. But all of that assumes good motives on al-Maliki's part, and it also assumes an ISF win in Basra - both are possible, but neither is a given.

A portion of al-Sadr's politic is laid bare if it's true that he's going to try to take Basra - that is, we know he's not even interested in Shi'a unity. Al-Sadr is after his own state, both ideologically and geographically, and unity is not especially important to him unless it is unity under his own banner. His courtship with al-Maliki is likely only because it's one more attempt at wresting juice from every lemon available, and is possibly a gambit to increase the odds that the IG does nothing if and when al-Sadr does try to take Basra - one that doesn't seem likely to work.

From Aswat Aliraq, there's word that the IG is ready for the handover and that security forces have the support of tribal groups and some political factions within Basra. That's not going to contain al-Sadr if he decides to move, but it does increase the motivation of the IG to not tacitly accept a Sadrist takeover.

Only time will tell if al-Sadr decides to become an active warlord again. But in the downtime, given the possible threat, it becomes that much more critical that the IG work towards gaining credibility and legitimacy as quickly as possible. The Christian Science Monitor (though a tick late) is right about 2008:

"The troop surge is the story of 2007. What the US needs in 2008 is a surge of political, military, diplomatic, and humanitarian activity across the board, in order to achieve a reduced but still attainable objective in Iraq – stability. Without stability, more ambitious goals cannot be achieved. With it, US forces can begin to withdraw."